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ABSTRACT 
BIRNBAUM, KYLE Quantitative Analysis of the Presence of a Bubble in the Higher 
Education Market. Department of Economics, June 2015 
ADVISOR: Professor Shelton Schmidt 
 
The relationship between the value of a college education and the price of the 
diploma is explored for exuberance in light of the accelerating growth rate of college 
tuition. With the Great Recession of 2007 still in on the minds of the American public, 
bubble formation and the subsequent burst is a concern for future economic stability. 
Discussion on the presence of a higher education bubble continues to increase however it 
has yet to be quantitatively assessed. This paper utilizes a modified price-dividend ratio, 
tailored for higher education, implemented in the econometric model for bubble detection 
developed by Phillips, Wu and Yu (2011) and Phillips, Shi and Yu (2013). The results 
from this study suggest the presence of bubble activity during the sample period, 
although there is inconsistency in the date-stamping process. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
Speculative asset bubbles have the potential to result in great wealth for those who know 
how to exploit them, however selling too soon can limit one’s earnings and selling too 
late very easily can result in a catastrophic loss in capital. Is the United States economy in 
the escalating period of a credit-based speculative asset bubble in regards to higher 
education? With the increase in college tuition potentially outpacing that of the value of a 
college degree, students are being forced to take out a greater quantity of larger loans, 
which are getting repaid more and more slowly and organizations such as Sallie Mae may 
suffer a fate similar to that of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. 
 
In the wake of the Great Recession, triggered by the 2008 crash of the real estate bubble 
in the United States, research on economic bubbles has begun to expand and become 
more robust. It is easy to state ex post facto that a certain market experienced a 
speculative asset bubble, however it is much more difficult to determine that a bubble is 
forming or when it will burst. It would be ideal to be able to realize there is a bubble 
forming in the economy so the Federal Reserve Bank can take a proactive stance in order 
to mitigate any potential fallout when it bursts, as well as informing consumers that their 
speculations of the intrinsic value of the asset are exaggerated.  
 
Using the lifespan of the 2008 housing bubble involving subprime mortgages and 
subsequent bubble analysis as a template, the state of higher education in the United State 
will be analyzed. College tuitions are constantly increasing, in one decade (2001-02 to 
2011-12), tuition at public and private not-for-profit institutions have increased by 40 and 
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28 percent, respectively according to the Institute of Education Sciences. The question is, 
how quickly is the value of a college education increasing, if at all, and does it justify the 
increasing cost? Different methods of evaluating the worth of a college degree will be 
explored and tests derived from the work of Peter C.B. Phillips, renowned 
Econometrician who specializes in stochastic characteristics of time series data, and his 
colleagues will be applied to the market to see if there is a bubble forming, and, if so, any 
possible consequences that may result from the burst. 
 
The asset price of an institution will be based on the sticker price of tuition for both 
public and private institutions in the United States. In order to calculate the intrinsic value 
of a college education, average annual earnings of those who hold a college degree or 
higher will be compared to the earnings of those finishing their education with a high 
school diploma. 
 
The results of this study are inconclusive, due to a small sample size of the data set. 
While the tests do imply the formation of a speculative asset bubble in the higher 
education market, the date-stamping process of the bubble is inconsistent.  
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Chapter 2: Literature Review 
2.1: Speculative Asset Bubbles 
In its simplest state, a bubble forms when the value placed on an asset by the public – the 
speculative future worth of the asset—becomes larger than the intrinsic value. This is 
most clearly seen in the stock market through the trading of certain commodities. When 
there is belief that an asset will increase in value, it will rapidly be purchased, driving the 
price higher and higher. This is considered the manic period of bubble formation.  
 
Charles Kindleberger details five stages of a bubble in his book Manias, Panics and 
Crashes: A History of Financial Crises. According to Kindleberger, bubbles begin to 
form due to some sort of displacement; an event or shock that would give reason to 
reassess the value of an investment. These can range from innovation, such as the case of 
the technology startups and the internet’s growth during in the dot-com bubble, to 
restructuring of government through deregulation of banks. This displacement leads to 
the creation of credit. Kindleberger cites Hyman Minsky in stating that credit supply is 
pro-cyclical. In times of economic prosperity, due to an optimistic outlook of the future, 
banks tend to become more lenient when granting credit, whereas in times of economic 
downturn, banks will become more stringent when loaning money. When the economy 
gets shocked into a boom through some displacement, lenders become eager to dole out 
credit, expecting a large return. This rapid growth of easy-to-acquire credit easily evolves 
into euphoria, Kindleberger’s next stage. 
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During euphoria, investors are extremely active in buying assets quickly for short-term 
capital gains. They will hold on to the asset for as long as they predict the value will 
increase, then sell it to a greater fool, one who still feels that the asset’s value will 
continue to rise. This is where information asymmetry plays a huge role. Even rational 
investors will be buying and selling an asset at different times because they have differing 
information from other investors or they do not believe others have the same information 
they have, resulting in their extending the life of the bubble by holding onto assets to sell 
at a later date. This rampant price increase can go on potentially for months, even years 
until there is a synchronization of investors disinvesting the asset, for whatever reason, 
causing the bubble to burst and prices to fall dramatically.  
 
The burst of the bubble brings the economy to Kindleberger’s bust stage, which is 
comprised of manic selling at any price in order to get the asset off the books of lenders. 
While in the bust stage, those who recklessly handed out credit are now struggling to see 
any return on their investment. When a large number of debtors are unable to pay back 
their loans, banks start to fail, as seen on a large scale with the collapse of Lehman 
Brothers in 2008. These closings result in a crash in consumer confidence and a 
slowdown or potential halt in market activity, causing prices to tumble in the final state of 
revulsion.  
 
2.2: The Housing Bubble 
The most recent bubble is the subprime mortgage crisis that predated the Great 
Recession. Origins of the housing bubble stem back to the stock market boom of the late 
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90’s, where consumption growth greatly outpaced the national income (Foster & 
Magdoff 2009). Those who increased their wealth during the lifespan of the dot com 
bubble began purchasing houses based on this recent influx of cash. Because of the sticky 
nature of housing supply, the increase in demand drove up housing prices in the United 
States, and they continued to rise (Baker 2008). The expectation was that the growth was 
perpetual and that borrowing to purchase a house would not be problematic, regardless of 
the amount, because the house will be worth more in the future. Banks had the same 
mentality, relaxing their lending standards, making purchasing a home out of an 
acceptable price range drastically easier (Foster & Magdoff 2009). This started the 
speculative manic activity of a forming bubble.   
 
Typical predictions would have the housing bubble pop alongside the stock market 
bubble. Instead, the population turned to real estate, seeing it as a safe investment, after 
the loss of confidence in the stock market. This, paired with the continuous slashing of 
interest rates by the Federal Reserve to promote economic growth in the aftermath of the 
collapse of the dot-com bubble, resulted in continuous growth of house prices (Baker 
2008). Construction began to take off as well in order to take advantage of the increased 
demand.  
 
When the bubble began to burst in 2007 due to the increase of interest rates, the market 
quickly shifted from a seller’s to a buyer’s market. The explosion of construction activity 
caused an excess of houses that could not be supported by the inflated real estate prices, 
sending prices into a downward tailspin. The use of adjustable rate mortgages was at an 
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all-time high during this run-up. These “sub-prime” mortgages appealed to those who 
could not really afford a home with “very low interest rates…charged for a few years 
before the rates become adjustable” (Foster & Magdoff 2009, 51).When the rate adjusted 
beyond the amount possible to be paid by households, bankruptcies and foreclosures 
began to spread.   
 
The extreme trend of foreclosures, although distressing to the homeowners and local 
commercial banks is not what caused the most distress to the economy. Companies such 
as Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, who are controllers of mortgage backed securities, were 
incentivized to acquire as many mortgages as possible, typically targeting lower income 
households. When securitization became a common practice in mortgage underwriting, 
the loans were no longer originated to be held by the bank. Instead, the bank passed the 
risk to the holder of the mortgage-backed securities (Schwartz 2009). When the bad 
loans, hidden amongst the strong loans, started to fail, the entire mortgage backed 
security started to depreciate in value. This caused major players in the economy, such as 
Bear Sterns and Lehman Brothers, who until recently were deemed “too big to fail,” 
failed. 
 
2.3: Signs of a Higher Education Bubble 
There are three facts that support the theory that there is a higher education bubble 
currently forming in the United States. College is getting more expensive every year, 
making the cost of a degree, the asset, higher. Student debt is increasing due to those 
rising prices, as well as the ease of borrowing money. The job market is oversaturated 
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with college graduates, making it significantly harder to find a job, decreasing the return 
on the investment. If there is a bubble forming, the nature in which these three trends 
interact will eventually result in a burst.  
 
2.3.1: Improvements to Marketing, not Education 
Why have tuition prices skyrocketed at an alarming rate—439% since 1982? Why does 
the market not hold the price down through simple supply and demand? Normally, when 
prices are so high, supply will eventually increase, which would bring the price closer to 
cost. However, higher education institutions are not ruled by the invisible hand of the free 
market. This is due to the large barriers to entry into the higher education market, driven 
by school prestige.  
 
Figure 1: Comparison of College Tuition to the Consumer Price Index over time. 
There is not a disparaging gap between the academic standing of peer institutions. The 
most salient differences between these colleges and universities are location, size, 
prestige and price. None of these factors can easily be translated into the best return on 
investment, however they are characteristics that are weighed heavily when most students 
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make decisions on their choice of a college. Competition is based upon how well the 
school can display physical amenities – marketing. Why has this become the custom? 
Why are schools, where the sole purpose for their existence is education, marketing their 
student life more than the classroom? It is because the success of a school is driven by 
prestige maximization. 
 
Top-tier colleges on average accept 10 percent of applicants. This is because they are not 
concerned with profit maximization; colleges and universities are focused on prestige. 
Colleges are successful when there is high competition to attend the institution, so funds 
go towards marketing the school for things such as new buildings, state-of-the-art 
dormitories, and salient athletic programs. No matter how many applications a college 
receives, they will still accept roughly the same number of students, due to housing and 
classroom availability. For this reason, the typical market solution of reducing prices to 
increase demand for a higher profit does not work for a college institution. Also, due to 
the barriers to entry in the higher education field as well as a delay in the expansion of an 
institution, a subsidy—easily attainable government aid, for example—that would 
typically incentivize an expansion of the market, simply allows colleges to augment 
tuition in response to the public’s increased ability to pay. 
 
Prestige is not pointless, however. If someone is spending four (or more) years at a 
college, these improvements to student life are important and marketing those benefits in 
and of itself is not problematic. The trend that schools are less focused on academics is 
worrisome. Academically Adrift: Limited Learning on College Campuses, Richard Arum 
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and Josipa Roska, follows 2,300 college students during their four years at 24 different 
universities. The initial shock is that more than 33 percent of students displayed no 
improvement in their critical thinking skills (Arum & Roksa, 2011). Why is this? It could 
be that students care less (no doubt a cause for concern, but not applicable to the topic at 
hand) but it also is the result of lax requirements at the institutions. Thirty-five percent of 
students study five or less hours per week. Half of the students reported that not one of 
their current courses required 20 pages or more of writing. This is not to say that all 
colleges are failing at educating their students. These numbers are averages and trends, 
but they speak to the point that the increasing price tag of colleges is mostly due to what 
were once considered nice extras to education, and not the education itself. 
 
2.3.2: Student Loans 
How and why do people still pay astronomical prices for higher education? The current 
culture dictates that no matter the cost, having a college diploma will lead to a more 
successful life. As a result, student loans have allowed students to pay for an education 
that they cannot afford and will take an increasingly longer time to repay. As of 2013, 
there is more than $1.1 trillion outstanding student loan debt in the United States spread 
across 38 million borrowers.  
 
The majority of the two thirds of college students that are receiving some sort of aid have 
government provided aid—nearly 70 percent as of 2006. In order to receive these loans, 
all that is required is to fill out the Free Application for Federal Student Aid (FAFSA) 
and have financial need approved by the institution. No credit check or risk analysis is 
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done to decide the probability that the loan will be repaid. There is a large distinction 
between government backed and private loans. Federal loans are beneficial for the 
student with lower interest rates, deferred interest payments until after graduation and no 
need for a cosigner. Being that these easy-to-acquire loans are so prevalent, driving 
tuition increases, often time students need even more loans to be able to afford higher 
education. After a slight decrease in private loans during the aftermath of the housing 
crisis, private loans have been increasing once again.  
 
The change in the bankruptcy code in 2005 which exempts student loans from being 
forgiven through bankruptcy can be attributed to the lax lending practices. Banks are not 
nervous about lending because there is a near guarantee that they will eventually get their 
loan reimbursed. This also makes student loans even more attractive as an investment in 
asset-backed securities. Securitization of student loans through companies like Sallie Mae 
and JPMorgan is safe because of the guaranteed return and, unlike a house or a stock 
which can be traded, a pop of the bubble will only impact the rate of loans, not those 
outstanding.  
 
Because money is so easy to acquire to attend higher education institutions, the explosion 
of tuition costs can be sustained and, as long as is it acknowledged that college graduates 
are better off than those with just a high school diploma, people will continue to borrow 
to attend. 
 
11 
 
2.3.3: State of the Job Market 
An important aspect of a bubble is that it is not formed simply by the price of an asset 
increasing; the price increase must be disproportionate to the intrinsic value of the asset. 
There is a multitude of ways to identify the value of a college degree, and the state of the 
job market has a large impact on that value. Factors taken into account are the average 
loan payment of graduates versus their average salaries, the demand for graduates—seen 
through the relative supply, and comparing salaries and job placement to those without a 
college degree. 
 
The average annual salary for the class of 2013 is $45,000. This may have been an 
increase from the class of 2012, but when compared to the rate of student loan payment 
the outlook does not appear as positive. The average graduate in the class of 2014 has 
approximately $33,000 of debt upon graduation, making them the most indebted class 
ever, a title that was previously held by the class of 2013. 
 
Figure 2: Average debt per student loan borrower over time. 
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In the years between 2001 and 2014, the number of college graduates has increased from 
1.1 million to 1.6 million. The market is getting flooded with college graduates, with 
numbers still climbing. This increase of supply, while demand stays constant (some argue 
demand is decreasing due to the maturity of the technology boom) leads to lower salaries, 
as per simple supply and demand analysis. One can argue that the demand for highly 
skilled workers is always increasing and that these new graduates are filling the need for 
specialized jobs. According to the numbers, this does not appear to be happening.  
 
The proportion of students that are underemployed is alarmingly high. Looking simply at 
the unemployment rate, or even the underemployment rate, of recent college graduates 
(between the age of 22 and 27) versus all college graduates, there is not an unprecedented 
difference. However, when looking deeper into the breakdown of unemployment, there is 
a scary trend forming. Underemployment, a college graduate being employed in an 
occupation that does not require a college degree, can be categorized by two different 
pools of jobs—good non-college jobs, those that do not require degrees but are career 
oriented and require skill such as a dental hygienist or a mechanic, and low-wage jobs 
such as a bartender or cashier. Since the 1990s, recent college graduates underemployed 
in good non-college jobs has decreased from 50 percent to around 36 percent and those 
holding low wage jobs rose from 15 to 20 percent by 2009. So while the number of 
graduates who are underemployed may not be an issue, the quality of job that they are 
holding while being underemployed shows that the value of an education is not holding 
the weight it used to. 
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Figure 3: Breakdown of underemployment market over time. 
More and more people are starting to realize this disparity between tuition and expected 
return on a college degree. The Bureau of Labor Statistics “predicts that 7 of the 10 
fastest growing jobs of the next decade will be based on on-the-job training rather than 
higher education” (Reynolds 2013). When people who realize that the value of a college 
degree is not what it used to be, the more likely it is that the bubble will burst. If people 
decide it is a better value to bypass higher education and focus on trade-oriented fields, 
then higher education institutions will not be able to sustain their bloated tuitions, 
crashing the system. This is not likely to happen in the near future. There are simply too 
many people holding true to convention that in order to get ahead in life, you need a 
college degree. People will likely turn to alternative forms of education. As online 
education becomes more robust, sophisticated, and commonplace it will start to become a 
proper alternative to traditional four year universities.  
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2.3.4: Comparing Tuition to the 2008 Housing Crisis 
Looking at the recent burst of the housing bubble, we can recount the events that led up 
to the Great Recession and compare them to the current state of college tuitions to assess 
the existence of a higher education bubble. Andrew Gillen ran this comparison in 2008, 
when fallout from the housing crash was still occurring. He summed up the cause of the 
housing crises, aside from rapidly increasing sticker prices, being “artificially low interest 
rates and lax lending standards” (Gillen 6).  
 
The first sign that a bubble may be forming is a rapid increase in the price of an asset, 
disproportionate to the intrinsic value. The true value of both residential real estate and 
higher education is very difficult to definitively define. Housing prices are based on many 
variables such as location and current market health, allowing for the same house to sell 
for different prices if it were in different locations, or sold at different times. Tuition price 
tends to be based on inputs, not outputs; based on amenities the school has in place not 
success of graduates. There is no simple way to place a value on either of these assets, 
causing the speculative price to run rampant, allowing a bubble to form.  
 
Much like housing, people rely heavily on loans to pay for a college education and a 
college loan is extremely easy to attain. In regards to the housing bubble, due to programs 
such as Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, banks are able to sell off their mortgage loans, 
relieving themselves of any risk and creating an incentive to make as many loans as 
possible. This securitization is also applicable to student loans through similar programs 
such as Sallie Mae and Citi Student Loans.  A default fee is built into most student loans 
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that goes to a guarantor who will reimburse a defaulted loan (although it is very difficult 
to default on student loans, they remain even through bankruptcy). The securitization and 
reimbursement guarantee disincentivizes lenders to run thorough credit screenings.  
 
Gillen stressed the effect of the artificially low interest rates of the mortgage loans in the 
housing crisis. Lenders were granting loans recklessly with low interest rates and the 
bubble popped when the Federal Reserve increased interest rates and suddenly 
homeowners who could not afford the new bloated payments simultaneously defaulted. 
The securitized loans plummeted; banks could not sell their mortgages, forcing them to 
stop lending recklessly. These deceivingly low rates can be seen with student loans as 
well. Federal grants boast a lower-than-average interest rate, currently at 4.66%. This 
increases students’ ability to pay for an institution. When colleges see that the ability to 
pay is increasing, they then can raise their tuitions, forcing students to take out more, 
private loans that do not have the same benefits as federal loans.  
 
One difference between the housing bubble and the tuition bubble is in how the bubble 
will be popped. In the housing market, payments could no longer be paid and loans were 
defaulted on, leading to house foreclosures. You cannot foreclose on a degree. Once 
obtained, a college degree is retained whether you can pay for your loans or not. Student 
loan debt is not forgiven even through bankruptcy, so something else must pop the 
bubble. A mass cultural divergence from the norm, a rising belief that college is no 
longer worth the price tag, will burst this bubble.  
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Chapter 3: Quantitative Measures of Bubbles 
The higher education market appears to mimic activity of the housing market of 2008, 
but it does not necessarily mean there is a bubble in the market. There have been many 
ways to quantitatively analyze the existence of a bubble. Due to the recent prevalence of 
bubbles in the United States economy, there has been a surge of advancements of this 
field. There has not been a published analysis that quantitatively assesses the possibility 
of a bubble in the higher education market in the United States. The steps of what is 
necessary to pinpoint start and end dates of a bubble as well as the model for such a test 
are articulated in Phillips, Shi and Yu (2013). 
 
The humble beginnings of bubble analysis were based predominantly on intuition and 
graphical analysis. One would plot a time-series of asset prices alongside respective 
fundamental values (intrinsic values) and mark where there would be a significant 
deviation in the graphs. There is clear cause for concern with this method, as there are a 
multitude of reasons as to why a deviation would occur, including natural tendencies in 
the market independent of bubble formation. The next logical step is to test both the asset 
price and fundamental value for unit roots. A unit root is indicative of a constant trend in 
the data.  
 
The Augmented Dickey Fuller Test (ADF test) is used in order to classify the two values 
as either stationary or non-stationary. The distribution of time series data that is stationary 
does not vary over time (Stock & Watson 2003). Chou explains that out of the four 
potential outcomes of this test – asset price and fundamental value are both stationary; 
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asset price is stationary while the fundamental value is non-stationary; asset price is non-
stationary while the fundamental value is stationary; and both the asset price and 
fundamental value are non-stationary – a bubble may be present in the second and fourth 
instances.  If the asset price is not stationary when the fundamental value is, that by 
definition is a bubble. If both values are non-stationary, a co-integration test must be 
performed in order to discern if they move with one another. If the asset price and the 
fundamental value are not co-integrated, according to the Augmented Dickey Fuller test, 
there is a bubble. Multiple data sets are considered co-integrated when they have the 
same stochastic, or long-term, trend. 
 
The Augmented Dickey Fuller test has been the standard bubble identification tool for a 
long time, despite several limitations to its power, or its ability for the test to correctly 
reject the null hypothesis. One criticism of the Augmented Dickey Fuller test is that it is 
inherently flawed by using a linear model in order to test for non-linear growth. Because 
by nature the market fluctuates, causing the Augmented Dickey Fuller test to seriously 
understate the growth of a bubble. If there is a bubble that is periodically growing and 
bursting, an ADF test using lengthy time series data can make the results appear less 
severe. The ADF test is based on the difference between the asset price and its 
fundamental value. If the bubble periodically bursts and brings the asset price back in line 
with fundamental value, the presence of the bubble can be blurred in the big picture.  
 
Phillips, Wu and Yu attempt to account for the limitations of the ADF test by using right-
tailed ADF tests as opposed to the popular left-tailed tests. The difference between the 
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two tests is the operator used in the alternative hypothesis. A right-tailed test calculates 
the p-values greater than the t-statistic, placing it in the right-tail. A left-tailed does the 
opposite, calculating the p-statistic less than the t-statistic, thus in the left-tail (Stock & 
Watson, 2003). They also recursively regress over expanding windows of time, 
sequentially adding one more time unit of data in order to accurately date-stamp the 
existence of a bubble. The right-tailed ADF test is more powerful in testing for non-linear 
explosive behavior. 
 
Phillips, Shi and Yu take the previous test one step further to make the detection more 
robust. Instead of rolling the end point of the window of time, the start point rolls as well. 
This results in testing near every possible combination of observations, accounting for 
any periodically collapsing bubble that may be present. This resolves the overarching 
issue of bubble detection; using a linear approach to test for nonlinear growth. 
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Chapter 4: Data 
The data for this regression has been collected from two sources. The price of higher 
education manifests itself as the average tuition and fees, including room and board for 
undergraduate institutions in 2014 dollars. This includes both private nonprofit four-year 
institutions and public four-year institutions. The data represents in-state charges for the 
public institutions from the 1979-1980 school year to the 2014-2015 school year and the 
posted tuition for private institutions for the same timeframe. The arithmetic mean of 
tuition for the same year was taken to yield the average undergraduate college tuition in 
the United States. The raw data was collected by College Board from the Annual Survey 
of Colleges, the College Board, Integrated Postsecondary Education Data System, U.S. 
Department of Education, and the National Center for Education Statistics. The College 
Board compiled the raw data into the published report in October of 2014.  
 
The intrinsic value of a college education is represented in one’s average salary post-
graduation. The median usual weekly earnings for those 25 years of age and older, who 
are employed full time was collected from the Bureau of Labor Statistics. From this, the 
earnings for those who graduated from high school and did not pursue higher education 
were collected as well as those who have attained a bachelor’s degree or higher between 
the years of 1979 and 2014. The data was given in nominal dollars, so the CPI for 1999 
was used to convert all years to 1999 dollars, and then the entire batch was converted to 
2014 dollars. Each data point was multiplied by 52 to get the average annual earnings. 
The average earnings for those holding only a high school degree was then subtracted 
from those who hold a bachelor’s degree or higher.  
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Figure 4: Time series visualization of data. 
Figure 4 displays the relationship between the independent data sets. The advantage of 
attaining a college degree has clearly been increasing constantly until approximately the 
2000’s, where the disparity, although varying, appears to somewhat plateau. Tuition has 
undisputedly been constantly increasing throughout the entirety of the data set. In 2010, 
average tuition surpasses the advantage higher education graduates gain through their 
education. 
 
The data collected do raise some concerns in regards to power, robustness and over-
simplicity. These concerns and the implications of not accounting for them will be 
discussed at length in the results section of this paper. 
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Chapter 5: Model 
There are two models that will be used to assess the presence of a bubble in the housing 
market, one that builds off of the other.  The forward expanding recursive sup ADF test 
(SADF) used by Phillips, Wu, and Yu (2011) will be used, as well as the rolling window 
generalized sup ADF test (GSADF) used by Phillips, Shi, and Yu (2013) (further referred 
to as PWY and PSY, respectively). Both tests utilize right-tailed unit Augmented Dickey 
Fuller tests (ADF), in order to detect for mild explosiveness, as opposed to the traditional 
left-tailed ADF tests, which concerns itself with unit root detection. The right tailed 
application is specifically applicable being that “explosive or mildly explosive … 
behavior in asset prices is a primary indicator of market exuberance during the 
inflationary phase of a bubble and it is the time series manifestation that may be 
subjected to econometric testing using recursive testing procedures like the right sided 
unit root tests in PWY” (PSY 2013, 7). 
 
Traditionally, when the SADF or GSADF tests are conducted, or bubble analysis in 
general is attempted, the asset pricing equation is used in order to account for discounting 
factors and dividend growth. Being that we are assessing the explosiveness in the college 
market, not in stocks or assets, that equation cannot be applied. However, as was 
referenced in PSY, “tests for a unit root in the price-dividend ratio do not preclude the 
presence of a (stationary or nonstationary) time-varying discount factor influencing the 
ratio” (PSY 2013, 33). The fact that the price-dividend ratio is an acceptable function to 
run the SADF and GSADF regressions on is extremely helpful in the unconventional task 
of testing for a bubble being caused by a non-tradable asset, in this case a college degree. 
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This is because a college degree has a price – tuition, and it has a dividend – return on 
schooling, or the premium seen in average earnings when a degree is attained. Thus, the 
price-dividend ratio for higher education would be: 
               
                                                       
 
I will also be taking the log-linear approximation of the ratio, by taking its natural 
logarithm, in order to make the numbers more manageable, as suggested in PSY.  
 
The first test, in alignment with rudimentary bubble testing techniques, will simply look 
for explosive behavior in the price of a college education as well as, according to the 
belief that there is a bubble in the market, a lack of explosive behavior in the premium in 
earnings. A simple right-tailed ADF test run on both the variables individually will yield 
these results. This is an important first step because if neither variable displays explosive 
behavior, there clearly is no evidence of a bubble.  
 
After the elementary level test for an indication of bubble behavior, the SADF test will be 
conducted, as explained in PWY. This uses a forward expanding window when applying 
the right-tailed ADF test. This process, as opposed to traditional unit root tests that cannot 
distinguish from data that is indicative of a bubble that is periodically collapsing and a 
unit root function, can differentiate between these two alternatives. It does this by looking 
at the data recursively, adding an additional data point each application. The nature of the 
window is depicted in figure 5 and is explained in PWY (2013, 9). 
The window size    expands from    to 1; so that    is the smallest sample 
window width fraction (initializing computation) and 1 is the largest window 
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fraction (the total sample size) in the recursion. The starting point    of the sample 
sequence is fixed at 0; so the end point of each sample (  ) equals   , and changes 
from    to 1. The ADF statistic for a sample that runs from 0 to    is denoted by 
    
   . The SADF statistic is defined as 
               
         
    
   .  
Although this process is more powerful in detecting periodically collapsing bubbles, it 
has still been proven to fail to detect all bubbles present. When applied to S&P 500 data 
in PSY, there are different indications of bubble activity when the data set is truncated, so 
it can be concluded that “the SADF test fails to find bubbles when the full sample is 
utilized whereas when the sample is truncated to exclude some of the collapse episodes 
the test succeeds in finding supportive evidence of bubbles” (PSY 2013, 26).  
 
PSY has accounted for this weakness by implementing the GSADF with a rolling 
window, which will be the next step in assessing the presence of a bubble in the higher 
education market. This technique results in vastly more subsamples, which has the ability 
to detect even minute instances of explosiveness in data sets. As opposed to only 
adjusting the end point of the window, the starting point is also incremented by a pre-
defined fraction of the whole data set. The GSADF statistic is denoted in PWY (2013, 
11) as 
             
         
            
      
    . 
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“Suppose the rolling window regression sample starts from the   
   fraction of the 
total sample (T) and ends at the   
   fraction of the sample, where          
and    is the (fractional) window size of the regression. The empirical regression 
model can then be written as 
                              
         
 
     
Where k is the lag order and  
   
         
  . The number of observations in the 
regression is         , where     is the floor function (giving the integer part of 
the argument). The ADF statistic (t-ratio) based on this regression is denoted 
by     
  ” (PWY 2013, 8). 
The differences between the forward expanding window used in the SADF test and the 
rolling window of the GSADF test are visually displayed in Figure 5. 
 
Figure 5: Visual representation of the differences between forward expanding and rolling windows. 
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The final task is to date-stamp the higher education bubble if it is present, pinpointing the 
time that the bubble began and, if applicable, ceased. This is done by performing a 
backward, recursive sup ADF test. This is more powerful when date stamping than the 
ADF test suggested by PWY because it does not have the danger of reporting stationary 
activity in the case of periodically collapsing bubbles. PWY’s SADF test performed an 
ADF test at    for each recursion of the test, where the GSADF test of PSY performs a 
sup ADF test at each   . A visual representation of the two processes is displayed in 
Figure 6.  
 
The results from the backward SADF test are then compared to the critical values of the 
test.  “[T]he origination date of a bubble [is defined] as the first observation whose 
backward sup ADF statistic exceeds the critical value of the backward sup ADF statistic. 
The termination date of a bubble is calculated as the first observation after [the 
origination date] whose backward sup ADF statistic falls below the critical value of the 
backward sup ADF statistic” (PWY 2013, 15). Because this test is powerful enough to 
pick up small blips of explosive behavior, a minimum duration of            must be 
present in order to characterize the observation a bubble, T being the sample size. 
Figure 6: Comparison of date-stamping strategies of the two tests. 
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Chapter 6: Empirical Application 
The models of bubble detection outlined above were run on the relevant higher education 
data via EViews 8. Itamar Caspi of the Bank of Israel developed an add-in for EViews 
called Rtadf which performs all relevant tests. The add-in is capable of executing a 
standard right-tailed ADF test, a rolling window ADF test, SADF test, and GSADF test. 
The add-in also calculates relevant critical values and the backward ADF and SADF tests 
required in order to date stamp possible bubbles. The add-in has been tested by 
replicating the empirical work published by PSY (2013). Caspi published this replication 
to ensure confidence in the robustness of his application.  
 
A standard right-tailed ADF test on the earnings premium and on the average tuition was 
conducted to observe the explosive nature of the variables. To minimize size distortion, a 
fixed lag length was used. The results of these tests are displayed in Table 1 and Table 2, 
respectively. The ADF statistic for the increase in a college graduate’s earnings is -2.17, 
failing to reject the null hypothesis of a unit root even at a 10% confidence interval, 
suggesting a lack in explosive behavior. However, the ADF statistic for college tuition is 
1.41, easily surpassing the critical value of 0.62 at the 1% confidence interval, implying 
explosive behavior of the variable. These results allow for us to move onto the more 
robust bubble detection tests. 
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Table 1: Output for right-tailed ADF test on the earnings premium of a bachelor's degree or higher. 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2: Output for right-tailed ADF test on college tuition. 
The SADF test is then applied to the natural log of the price-divided ratio as defined in 
the model section above. Because of the limited observations in the sample size, the 
initial window size was set to 7% of the sample. The output is displayed in Table 3. The 
SADF statistic is 0.70, which is indicative of explosive behavior at only the 10% 
confidence level which has a critical value of 0.56.  
 
     
        t-Statistic Prob.* 
     
     SADF   0.693635  0.0570 
Test critical values: 99% level   1.339359  
 95% level   0.841079  
 90% level   0.559163  
     
     *Right-tailed test   
Table 3: Output for the sup ADF test on the price-dividend ratio. 
     
     Earnings Premium of 
Bachelor’s Degree +  t-Statistic Prob.* 
     
     ADF  -2.169297  0.7760 
Test critical values: 99% level   0.615827  
 95% level  -0.082050  
 90% level  -0.425177  
     
     *Right-tailed test   
     
     College Tuition   t-Statistic Prob.* 
     
     ADF   1.411092  0.0030 
Test critical values: 99% level   0.615827  
 95% level  -0.082050  
 90% level  -0.425177  
     
     *Right-tailed test   
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We then compare this output to that of the GSADF test, shown on Table 4. The window 
size was set to the same value as for the SADF test. The GSADF allows us to easily 
reject the null hypothesis of a unit root at a 5% confidence interval with the GSADF 
statistic of 4.70 being greater than the 5% critical value of 1.94.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
When it comes to date stamping for the SADF and GSADF tests, we look at the graphical 
representation of the backwards ADF and SADF values, respectively, and compare them 
to the 95% critical values, generated by Monte Carlo simulations with 1,000 replications. 
These graphs, generated by the add-in, are displayed as Figures 7 and 8, respectively. 
     
        t-Statistic Prob.* 
     
     GSADF   4.698835  0.0130 
Test critical values: 99% level   4.962406  
 95% level   1.942738  
 90% level   1.349208  
     
     *Right-tailed test   
Table 4: Output for the GSADF test on the price-dividend ratio. 
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Figure 7: Date-stamping output for SADF Test 
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Figure 8: Date-stamping output for GSADF Test 
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Chapter 7: Results 
The first test of exuberance in the individual variables suggests that a bubble can be 
present in the higher education market. Bubbles are present when the price of an asset 
grows at a disproportionate rate to the return on that investment. The evidence of 
explosive behavior in the trend of college tuition and the lack of explosive behavior in the 
trend of the earnings premium achieved when holding a bachelors degree or higher 
suggests that the market behavior is indicative of a bubble. This is the most rudimentary 
level of bubble testing, but a necessary first step. If no exuberance was detected then the 
analysis could cease. Because the data set passes this first test easily, it is appropriate to 
continue the assessment of the presence of a bubble in the market. 
 
The SADF test does not offer extremely conclusive results of a bubble in the market. The 
SADF statistic of approximately 0.70 allows for the null hypothesis to be rejected at the 
10% confidence level, but not at the 5% or 1% levels. Depending on the confidence 
threshold used, the test could potentially insist on a bubble being present during the 
sample period. When looking at the date-stamping graph for the SADF test, the market is 
currently in the time of market exuberance suggested by the SADF statistic. The bubble 
started in 2009 and the forward ADF sequence is trending upwards, suggesting the 
bubble is continuing to grow. This is also the only instance of bubble activity in the 
sample period, according to this test. 
 
The GSADF test tells a much different story. Similar to the SADF statistic, the GSADF 
statistic cannot reject the null hypothesis of unit root behavior at the 1% confidence 
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interval. However, it can reject the null hypothesis at the 5% confidence interval, 
providing stronger evidence for the presence of a bubble. Where the discrepancy between 
the two tests comes into play is when date-stamping is attempted. According to the 
GSADF output, there were two periods of bubble-like exuberance. The first one started in 
1995 and lasted only two years, until 1997. The second period of exuberance lasted only 
one year, between 2011 and 2012. The latter period, according to parameters set by PWY 
did not have long enough duration to be considered a bubble. The required length is 
denoted by         and with a sample size of 36, a period of exuberance must last 1.56 
years in order to be deemed a bubble. 
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Chapter 8: Conclusion 
As expected, the SADF and GSADF yielded different outcomes, and neither of them 
produced results that could be accepted at the 1% confidence interval. However, the 
outcomes of the tests, and even the discrepancies, speak to the current nature of the 
higher education market.  
 
Both tests acknowledge the presence of a bubble at some point during the sample period, 
although they differ on when the bubble occurred. Looking at the second period of 
exuberance displayed from the GSADF test, although it was not sustained long enough to 
be denoted as a bubble, it points to the writing on the wall for college tuitions. Both tests 
suggest a bubble during this post-2008 time frame as well as showing a trend leading up 
to a bubble.  
 
8.1: Limitations 
There are some clear limitations to the results that were derived in this paper. The first 
and foremost concern lies with the sample size of the data set used. When the SADF and 
GSADF tests are used, there are typically thousands of observations, making the results 
more significant. Market exuberance tests are traditionally run on S&P data, where 
observations can be collected daily. However, being that by nature the variables used in 
this paper are reported annually, there is a severe limitation on the quantity of 
observations available.  
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Similarly, the results may be skewed because the two variables may not be directly 
comparable. For price of higher education, the average undergraduate tuition in the 
United States was used. The intrinsic value of college education was evaluated by using 
the annual earnings of those who have their bachelor’s degrees or higher. Data 
representing those who have only a bachelor’s degree would be more representative of a 
bubble in the undergraduate market, however such a data set only dates back to 2000. As 
opposed to limiting the power of test further by limiting the data set to only fourteen 
observations, the data representing those who have a bachelor’s degree or higher was 
used. If the ideal data set was used, the findings would be more conclusive and, one could 
assume, point more towards the creation of a bubble. Including the earnings of 
exceptionally lucrative professions such as medical doctors and attorneys, that require 
significantly more schooling, increases the premium in earnings due to education. This 
inflation is not accounted for in the average undergraduate tuition, skewing the results to 
make it appear that an undergraduate degree is intrinsically worth more than in reality.  
 
8.2: Future Application 
Although there were no conclusive findings in this report, it sets the stage for future 
quantitative research on the higher education bubble. Most importantly, when more 
historical data is collected on college tuitions and earnings of those who hold only a 
bachelor’s degree, the GSADF test will certainly have more definitive results for the 
presence of a bubble.  
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Although the results imply the trend of a bubble forming, there will not be a devastating 
pop of this bubble unless there is a shock, like any asset bubble. The shock to pop the 
higher education bubble has to be a viable alternative to traditional college. This is not 
going to happen in the near future. Online education is the closest alternative that could 
compete with traditional undergraduate institutions, and that is not nearly prestigious 
enough, yet, to cause the pop. The culture of the job market in the United States is that a 
college education is required, and the traditional route is typically held in higher regard. 
The bubble will not pop until there is a change in that culture. 
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Appendix A: Data 
 
Median Usual Weekly Earnings (Bachelor's Degree and Higher) 
Year  Earnings  
1999 
CPIs 
1999 Dollars 2013 Dollars-weekly 
1979  $   344.00  2.555  $        878.92   $                     1,229.61  
1980  $   376.00  2.295  $        862.92   $                     1,207.23  
1981  $   407.00  2.022  $        822.95   $                     1,151.31  
1982  $   438.00  1.833  $        802.85   $                     1,123.19  
1983  $   461.00  1.726  $        795.69   $                     1,113.16  
1984  $   486.00  1.673  $        813.08   $                     1,137.50  
1985  $   506.00  1.603  $        811.12   $                     1,134.75  
1986  $   525.00  1.548  $        812.70   $                     1,136.97  
1987  $   564.00  1.52  $        857.28   $                     1,199.33  
1988  $   585.00  1.467  $        858.20   $                     1,200.61  
1989  $   609.00  1.408  $        857.47   $                     1,199.60  
1990  $   638.00  1.344  $        857.47   $                     1,199.60  
1991  $   666.00  1.275  $        849.15   $                     1,187.96  
1992  $   696.00  1.223  $        851.21   $                     1,190.84  
1993  $   715.00  1.187  $        848.71   $                     1,187.34  
1994  $   733.00  1.153  $        845.15   $                     1,182.36  
1995  $   747.00  1.124  $        839.63   $                     1,174.64  
1996  $   758.00  1.093  $        828.49   $                     1,159.06  
1997  $   779.00  1.062  $        827.30   $                     1,157.39  
1998  $   821.00  1.038  $        852.20   $                     1,192.23  
1999  $   860.00  1.022  $        878.92   $                     1,229.61  
2000  $   891.00  1.000  $        891.00   $                     1,246.51  
2001  $   921.00  0.967  $        890.61   $                     1,245.96  
2002  $   941.00  0.941  $        885.48   $                     1,238.79  
2003  $   964.00  0.926  $        892.66   $                     1,248.84  
2004  $   986.00  0.905  $        892.33   $                     1,248.37  
2005  $1,013.00  0.882  $        893.47   $                     1,249.96  
2006  $1,039.00  0.853  $        886.27   $                     1,239.89  
2007  $1,072.00  0.826  $        885.47   $                     1,238.78  
2008  $1,115.00  0.804  $        896.46   $                     1,254.15  
2009  $1,137.00  0.774  $        880.04   $                     1,231.17  
2010  $1,144.00  0.777  $        888.89   $                     1,243.55  
2011  $1,150.00  0.764  $        878.60   $                     1,229.16  
2012  $1,165.00  0.741  $        863.27   $                     1,207.71  
2013  $1,194.00  0.726  $        866.84   $                     1,212.71  
2014  $1,193.00  0.715  $        853.00   $                     1,193.34  
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Median Usual Weekly Earnings (High School Diploma) 
Year Earnings 1999 CPIs 1999 Dollars 2013 Dollars 
1979  $ 249.00  2.555  $        636.20   $        890.04  
1980  $ 266.00  2.295  $        610.47   $        854.05  
1981  $ 286.00  2.022  $        578.29   $        809.03  
1982  $ 302.00  1.833  $        553.57   $        774.44  
1983  $ 311.00  1.726  $        536.79   $        750.96  
1984  $ 323.00  1.673  $        540.38   $        755.99  
1985  $ 333.00  1.603  $        533.80   $        746.78  
1986  $ 344.00  1.548  $        532.51   $        744.98  
1987  $ 356.00  1.52  $        541.12   $        757.03  
1988  $ 368.00  1.467  $        539.86   $        755.26  
1989  $ 375.00  1.408  $        528.00   $        738.67  
1990  $ 386.00  1.344  $        518.78   $        725.78  
1991  $ 397.00  1.275  $        506.18   $        708.14  
1992  $ 403.00  1.223  $        492.87   $        689.52  
1993  $ 415.00  1.187  $        492.61   $        689.15  
1994  $ 421.00  1.153  $        485.41   $        679.09  
1995  $ 432.00  1.124  $        485.57   $        679.31  
1996  $ 443.00  1.093  $        484.20   $        677.39  
1997  $ 461.00  1.062  $        489.58   $        684.93  
1998  $ 479.00  1.038  $        497.20   $        695.59  
1999  $ 490.00  1.022  $        500.78   $        700.59  
2000  $ 505.00  1.000  $        505.00   $        706.50  
2001  $ 520.00  0.967  $        502.84   $        703.47  
2002  $ 535.00  0.941  $        503.44   $        704.31  
2003  $ 554.00  0.926  $        513.00   $        717.69  
2004  $ 574.00  0.905  $        519.47   $        726.74  
2005  $ 583.00  0.882  $        514.21   $        719.37  
2006  $ 595.00  0.853  $        507.54   $        710.04  
2007  $ 604.00  0.826  $        498.90   $        697.97  
2008  $ 618.00  0.804  $        496.87   $        695.12  
2009  $ 626.00  0.774  $        484.52   $        677.85  
2010  $ 626.00  0.777  $        486.40   $        680.48  
2011  $ 638.00  0.764  $        487.43   $        681.92  
2012  $ 652.00  0.741  $        483.13   $        675.90  
2013  $ 651.00  0.726  $        472.63   $        661.20  
2014  $ 668.00  0.715  $        477.62   $        668.19  
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Average Tuition 
Academic 
Year 
Private 
Nonprofit 
Four-
Year 
Public 
Four-
Year 
Average Undergrad Tuition 
and Fees and Room and 
Board in 2014 Dollars 
79-80 $16,339 $7,587 $  11,963.00 
80-81 $16,116 $7,349 $  11,732.50 
81-82 $16,464 $7,465 $  11,964.50 
82-83 $17,413 $7,810 $  12,611.50 
83-84 $18,504 $8,187 $  13,345.50 
84-85 $19,342 $8,427 $  13,884.50 
85-86 $19,674 $8,529 $  14,101.50 
86-87 $21,436 $8,812 $  15,124.00 
87-88 $21,888 $8,791 $  15,339.50 
88-89 $23,443 $8,957 $  16,200.00 
89-90 $24,049 $9,030 $  16,539.50 
90-91 $24,622 $9,271 $  16,946.50 
91-92 $24,819 $9,537 $  17,178.00 
92-93 $25,482 $9,893 $  17,687.50 
93-94 $26,061 $10,249 $  18,155.00 
94-95 $26,487 $10,628 $  18,557.50 
95-96 $27,156 $10,535 $  18,845.50 
96-97 $27,857 $10,838 $  19,347.50 
97-98 $28,738 $11,087 $  19,912.50 
98-99 $29,873 $11,342 $  20,607.50 
99-00 $30,692 $11,548 $  21,120.00 
00-01 $30,664 $11,635 $  21,149.50 
01-02 $32,021 $12,123 $  22,072.00 
02-03 $32,896 $12,795 $  22,845.50 
03-04 $33,758 $13,642 $  23,700.00 
04-05 $34,549 $14,310 $  24,429.50 
05-06 $35,046 $14,772 $  24,909.00 
06-07 $35,705 $15,029 $  25,367.00 
07-08 $36,593 $15,507 $  26,050.00 
08-09 $36,610 $15,567 $  26,088.50 
09-10 $38,799 $16,855 $  27,827.00 
10-11 $39,850 $17,680 $  28,765.00 
11-12 $40,043 $18,092 $  29,067.50 
12-13 $41,022 $18,528 $  29,775.00 
13-14 $41,771 $18,749 $  30,260.00 
14-15 $42,419 $18,943 $  30,681.00 
 
41 
 
Year 
 Difference in 
Average Annual 
Earnings  
 Average 
Undergraduate 
Tuition  
Price-Dividend Ratio 
ln price/dividend 
ratio 
1979  $ 17,657.76   $   11,963.00  0.677492567 -0.389356697 
1980  $ 18,365.23   $   11,732.50  0.638842984 -0.448096576 
1981  $ 17,798.67   $   11,964.50  0.672213104 -0.39717987 
1982  $ 18,135.20   $   12,611.50  0.695415414 -0.363245894 
1983  $ 18,834.46   $   13,345.50  0.708568336 -0.344508773 
1984  $ 19,838.31   $   13,884.50  0.699883317 -0.356841648 
1985  $ 20,174.40   $   14,101.50  0.698979805 -0.358133429 
1986  $ 20,383.12   $   15,124.00  0.741986629 -0.298424056 
1987  $ 23,000.01   $   15,339.50  0.66693456 -0.405063349 
1988  $ 23,158.53   $   16,200.00  0.699526399 -0.357351746 
1989  $ 23,968.43   $   16,539.50  0.690053568 -0.370986049 
1990  $ 24,638.87   $   16,946.50  0.687795212 -0.374264142 
1991  $ 24,950.75   $   17,178.00  0.688476428 -0.373274198 
1992  $ 26,068.45   $   17,687.50  0.678502289 -0.387867426 
1993  $ 25,905.56   $   18,155.00  0.70081473 -0.355511721 
1994  $ 26,170.07   $   18,557.50  0.709111469 -0.343742544 
1995  $ 25,757.16   $   18,845.50  0.731660722 -0.312438367 
1996  $ 25,046.77   $   19,347.50  0.772454809 -0.258181771 
1997  $ 24,568.16   $   19,912.50  0.81050014 -0.210103766 
1998  $ 25,825.25   $   20,607.50  0.797959392 -0.22569757 
1999  $ 27,508.93   $   21,120.00  0.767750726 -0.264290174 
2000  $ 28,080.73   $   21,149.50  0.753167795 -0.28346724 
2001  $ 28,209.27   $   22,072.00  0.782437727 -0.245340942 
2002  $ 27,793.08   $   22,845.50  0.821985114 -0.196032994 
2003  $ 27,619.51   $   23,700.00  0.858089217 -0.153047203 
2004  $ 27,124.82   $   24,429.50  0.900632729 -0.104657731 
2005  $ 27,590.41   $   24,909.00  0.90281381 -0.102238937 
2006  $ 27,552.00   $   25,367.00  0.920695561 -0.08262585 
2007  $ 28,122.05   $   26,050.00  0.92631942 -0.076536158 
2008  $ 29,069.23   $   26,088.50  0.897461059 -0.108185547 
2009  $ 28,772.85   $   27,827.00  0.967126913 -0.033425548 
2010  $ 29,280.05   $   28,765.00  0.982409473 -0.017747079 
2011  $ 28,456.69   $   29,067.50  1.02146456 0.021237441 
2012  $ 27,653.92   $   29,775.00  1.076701056 0.073901788 
2013  $ 28,678.57   $   30,260.00  1.055143226 0.053676517 
2014  $ 27,307.78   $   30,681.00  1.123525949 0.116471909 
 
